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ver wonder how you obtained that camera, television, or other 
product so cheaply?  The most likely answer is that it came from 
a “gray market” source.  Throughout the world, barriers to foreign 
trade are crumbling.  International business transactions and deals fuel 
increased international free trade.  An element of increased free trade 
that has been one of the most vexing and problematic areas for 
manufacturers is the phenomenon of “parallel” importation or “gray 
market” importation.  In the United States alone, this problem costs 
American manufacturers billions of dollars each year. 
Generally, gray market or parallel importation occurs when a third 
party purchases “genuine” U.S. trademarked or copyrighted goods, 
manufactured or distributed abroad, and imports and sells these goods 
in the United States without the consent of the American holder of the 
trademark or copyright.  Gray market goods are distinguishable from 
black market goods (i.e., counterfeit or imitation goods) in that the 
U.S. trademark or copyright holder manufactures the goods or permits 
a foreign licensee to produce the goods according to established 
specifications.  This Article examines the gray market or parallel 
importation (terms this Article uses interchangeably) as it impacts 
American manufacturers from three discrete legal perspectives: (1) 
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trademark law, (2) customs law, and (3) copyright law.  Further, this 
Article explores in depth the case law in the United States that has 
framed the gray market discussion.  This Article concludes by 
recommending that American manufacturers turn to tort law as a 
solution to their gray market issues.  Specifically, this Article 
advocates for the use of the tort of intentional interference with 
performance of contract by a third person as a means to combat the 
problem of gray market or parallel importation of goods. 
As mentioned above, parallel importation generally occurs when a 
third party imports and sells U.S. trademarked or copyrighted goods, 
which were manufactured or distributed abroad, in the United States 
without the consent of the American holder of the trademark or 
copyright.1  Each year, a plethora of genuine goods and products 
reach the shores of this country.  Across a vast multitude of industry 
segments, the gray market is a multi-billion-dollar concern affecting 
domestic manufacturers.  The Alliance for Gray Market and 
Counterfeit Abatement, a nonprofit organization founded in 2001 by 
3Com, Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard, and Nortel, estimated that, in 
2003, the gray market for information technology goods amounted to 
$40 billion, costing information technology manufacturers upwards of 
$5 billion annually in lost profits.2  This is staggering considering the 
impact of the gray market on just one industry segment—here 
information technology.  The gray market affects a number of other 
industry segments and products.  Although statistics do not exist, the 
 
1 As one authority has noted: 
 One of the most controversial areas of customs law concerns “gray market 
goods,” goods produced abroad with authorization and payment but which are 
imported into unauthorized markets.  Trade in gray market goods has 
dramatically increased in recent years, in part because fluctuating currency 
exchange rates create opportunities to import and sell such goods at a discount 
from local price levels.  Licensors and their distributors suddenly find themselves 
competing in their home or other “reserved” markets with products made abroad 
by their own licensees.  Or, in the reverse, startled licensees find their licensor’s 
products intruding on their local market shares.  In either case, third party 
importers and exporters are often the immediate source of the gray market goods, 
and they have little respect for who agreed to what in the licensing agreement.  
When pressed, such third parties will undoubtedly argue that any attempt through 
licensing at allocating markets or customers is an antitrust or competition law 
violation. 
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 736 (2d ed. 2001). 
2 Alliance for Gray Market & Counterfeit Abatement, Resources: FAQ, 
http://www.agmaglobal.org/resources/faq.shtml#gray market2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
 2009] The Graying of the American Manufacturing Economy 1141 
impact of the gray market across all industry segments worldwide is 
likely sizable. 
Three discrete bodies of law are relevant in discussing gray market 
importation: (1) trademark law, (2) customs law, and (3) copyright 
law.  This Article employs two lines of analysis in its examination of 
parallel importation.  First, this Article analyzes parallel importation 
from the perspective of trademark and customs law.  Second, this 
Article examines parallel importation under the doctrine of copyright 
law.  Under the two discrete regimes of intellectual property law—
trademark and copyright—gray market goods were once afforded 
differing treatments.  In the United States, under Supreme Court 
precedent, trademark and copyright laws are now synchronized, and 
parallel importation is legal. 
Rather than discuss all possible legal “solutions” to parallel 
importation or the propriety of its existence, this Article examines the 
history of the gray market in the United States through an analysis of 
both the domestic legislative framework and judicial treatment of 
gray market goods, primarily under trademark and copyright law.  As 
a primary “solution” to the gray market problem, this Article 
examines and highlights tort law as a viable means available to 
concerned manufacturers to remedy gray market problems. 
Part I of this Article provides a general introduction into the 
structural factors that cause parallel importation, such as currency 
fluctuation, price discrimination among markets and territories, and 
production and cost differentials in manufacturing products.  Part I 
concludes by offering three models to illustrate how the gray market 
functions.  Part II begins a discussion of trademarked goods by 
looking at the purposes of trademark law.  Next, this Article explores 
both the historic underpinnings of the case law and the earliest 
statutory efforts to regulate parallel importation.  Subsequently, Part 
II concludes the trademark discussion of parallel importation by 
looking at administrative and judicial interpretations and exceptions 
that have allowed the practice of parallel importation under customs 
law. 
Using American copyright law as a lens, Part III starts by 
discussing the relevant doctrines and provisions of the Copyright Act 
of 1976, which frame the gray market discussion.  Part III examines 
both the early gray market case law that caused a split of authority 
among the federal circuit courts of appeal and the pivotal U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, Quality King Distributors v. L’anza 
Research International, Inc., which opened the way for the legal 
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parallel importation of gray market goods.  Part III concludes by 
examining the current debate and the unanswered question in Quality 
King Distributors, the analysis of which is currently pending before 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.  
Finally, Part IV concludes by examining possibly the last viable 
means to exclude gray market goods from the United States: a tort 
action for intentional interference with performance of a contract by a 
third person. 
I 
FACTORS THAT CAUSE GRAY MARKETS 
A.  Currency Fluctuations 
In answering why gray markets occur and exist, the easiest and 
first answer is currency fluctuation.  Profit maximization is the engine 
that drives business in the capitalist world.  In the international trade 
context, with the ebb, tide, and flow of currency fluctuations, it 
becomes extremely advantageous to purchase large quantities of 
products from a nation with a weakly valued currency and import 
those same products to nations with a more strongly valued currency. 
To illustrate this point, assume that the U.S. dollar has 
hypothetically become relatively strong in relation to its Asian 
counterparts like the Japanese yen, the Hong Kong dollar, and the 
South Korean won.  With a downturn in these Asian currencies, it is 
lucrative to purchase a vast array of items from the Asian countries 
and import these products to the United States to undercut higher-
priced U.S. products. 
In politics, political strategist James Carville is credited with 
coining the phrase “It’s the economy, stupid!” in Bill Clinton’s 1992 
presidential campaign against George H.W. Bush.3  In the gray 
market context, the saying goes like this: “It’s the exchange rate, 
stupid!” 
To further illustrate the above example, assume that a South 
Korean manufacturer produces high-end cameras.  The South Korean 
camera manufacturer has an extensive U.S. distribution system in 
place whereby American distributors/licensees sell its cameras to 
retail establishments.  The South Korean camera manufacturer 
charges its distributors/licensees $100 per camera at wholesale.  In 
 
3 See Louis Uchitelle, Flat Wages Seen as Issue in ’96 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
1995, at A26. 
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addition to the American distributors/licensees, the South Korean 
camera manufacturer has an extensive worldwide market and 
distribution system, including Japan where the company sells cameras 
to its distributors/licensees for the equivalent, convertible sum of 
$100.  Further, assume that both the American and Japanese 
distributors/licensees mark up the price charged to retailers by 
twenty-five percent per camera.  Finally, assume that the price to 
import goods (shipping, packaging, and customs tariffs and duties) to 
the United States from Japan is ¥10.  In the end, the American 
distributors and licensees sell the camera to the retailer for $125 
($100 per unit + $25 markup = $125), while the Japanese distributors 
and licensees sell to the retailer for, hypothetically, ¥l25. 
Where the currency exchange rates are at a ratio of 1:1, parallel 
importation is economically inefficient.  Both products are priced the 
same when the currencies are converted ($125).  In addition, the 
Japanese distributors/licensees would have to pay $10 extra to import 
cameras to the United States, for a grand total of $135 ($100 per unit 
+ $25 markup + $10 shipping = $135).  This scenario would not allow 
the Japanese distributor/licensee to have a cost advantage in relation 
to its American counterpart. 
Tinker with the facts for a moment, and a different result becomes 
readily apparent.  If the exchange rate between dollars and yen 
changed to a ratio of 1:2, namely $1 = ¥2, then a gray market situation 
would be born.  Assume the South Korean camera manufacturer 
would still charge $100 and ¥l00 respectively to its American and 
Japanese distributors/licensees.  Assume further that the shipping 
costs remain ¥10 (now converted to $5 with the new exchange rate).  
As a result of the currency fluctuation, the Japanese 
distributors/licensees cost (with retail markups included) for the South 
Korean camera would be equal to $62.50 (¥l25 = $62.50 at a $1:¥2 
currency exchange rate).  With shipping costs at $5 (¥10), the total 
cost to sell the South Korean camera from Japan into the United 
States becomes $67.50.  The American distributors’ and licensees’ 
relative cost to sell its product in the United States becomes $75.  By 
importing into the United States, the Japanese distributor/licensee nets 
a profit of $7.50 per unit sold ($75.00 - $67.50 = $7.50) resulting 
from the parallel importation. 
Profit maximization is the energy that fuels business.  So, in the 
international context, a gray market importer gains from currency 
fluctuations. 
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B.  Price Discrimination in Markets and Territories 
Another reason the gray market exists is directly related to the 
pricing behavior of manufacturers in various markets.  Often, when a 
manufacturer produces a product it prices that product for an intended 
“audience” based on the audience’s ability to pay for the good.  There 
is broad variation of product placement within markets.  A 
manufacturer may produce a product to appeal to the discount market, 
the middle-range market, or the luxury market.  In terms of 
international trade, at the microeconomic strata, the ability of market 
participants to pay the price charged for an item governs the initial 
pricing decision.  This is particularly true in the modern economy, in 
which multinational corporations have become adept at controlling 
manufacturing costs and have dominant positions in terms of “market 
power” within individual economies.4 
To illustrate, say it costs a U.S. widget manufacturer, McWidget, 
$25 to manufacture its widget.  In setting a palatable market price, 
McWidget may charge Americans $250 per piece for its widgets, 
drawing comfort from the fact that the average American has the 
ability and resources to pay such a premium price.  In Mexico, due to 
harsher economic circumstances, McWidget may charge $50 for the 
same widget.  In Germany, where the economy is finely tuned, 
McWidget might price its widgets at $150.  In Japan, McWidget 
might charge $200 for the widget because the Japanese consumer has 
the ability to pay, much like the American consumer.  Finally, in 
Hong Kong, McWidget might choose to price the widget at $175.  
These examples demonstrate that price is largely driven by market 
forces—or the ability of consumers to pay for a particular product—
and as a result of those market forces, manufacturers exercise a great 
deal of discretion within the confines of the market with respect to 
their pricing behavior. 
Few courts have paid much attention to price discrimination among 
markets.  However, in NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, a gray 
market case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made a 
bold statement against the very sort of discrimination that fuels gray 
markets.  The court wrote: 
If NEC-Japan chooses to sell abroad at lower prices than those it 
could obtain for the identical product here, that is its business.  In 
 
4 See generally Richard M. Andrade, Comment, The Parallel Importation of 
Unauthorized Genuine Goods: Analysis and Observations of the Gray Market, 14 U. PA. J. 
INT’L BUS. L. 409, 415–16 (1993). 
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doing so, however, it cannot look to United States trademark law to 
insulate the American market or to vitiate the effects of 
international trade.  This country’s trademark law does not offer 
NEC-Japan a vehicle for establishing a worldwide discriminatory 
pricing scheme simply through the expedient of setting up an 
American subsidiary with nominal title to its mark.5 
C.  Production and Cost Differences Between Nations 
A final explanation for gray market occurrence can be found in 
production and other cost differentials associated with producing 
goods in more than one market.  Differentials in raw material costs, 
labor costs, marketing and advertising costs, utility costs, fuel costs, 
plant efficiency, tax liability, governmental and regulatory 
compliance costs, and government subsidies and price supports, 
among other factors, may govern how much it costs to provide a good 
to consumers in a particular market.6   These factors may determine 
the ultimate price that consumers have to pay for goods in a specific 
market, not price discrimination.  Manufacturing activity in a high-
cost environment may require upward price adjustment.7  Conversely, 
manufacturing in a low-cost environment may require the opposite, 
price deflation.  “[P]rice differentials that give rise to the gray markets 
occur because of cost considerations largely outside the control of the 
manufacturer . . . .”8 
D.  Three Contexts in Which the Gray Market Arises 
The gray market can arise in three general contexts.  In case 1, a 
U.S. firm purchased the rights to register and use the trademark or 
copyright of foreign-manufactured products and sells these products 
in the United States.9  The U.S. firm discovers that the foreign firm is 
importing the trademarked goods and distributing them in the United 
States itself or selling them to a third party abroad who imports them 
to the United States.10  In this scenario, the U.S. trademark purchaser 
is known as the “gray-market victim.”11 
 
5 NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1987). 
6 Andrade, supra note 4, at 416–17. 
7 Id. at 417. 
8 Id. 
9 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286 (1988). 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
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Case 2, the most common gray market scenario, occurs when a 
U.S. firm registers the U.S. trademark for goods that are 
manufactured by an affiliated manufacturer abroad.12  In a standard 
variation (case 2A), a foreign firm that wishes to control distribution 
of its product in the United States incorporates a subsidiary in the 
United States.13  Then, the subsidiary registers under its own name (or 
the name the foreign firm/manufacturer assigns to the subsidiary), a 
U.S. trademark identical to the foreign parent’s trademark.14  “The 
parallel importation by a third party who buys the goods abroad (or 
conceivably even by the affiliated foreign manufacturer itself) creates 
a gray market.”15  Two other variations of this theme may occur when 
an American-based company establishes a manufacturing subsidiary 
corporation abroad (case 2B) or its own unincorporated 
manufacturing unit (case 2C) to produce trademarked goods, “and 
then imports them for domestic distribution.”16  When the foreign 
subsidiary or the trademark owner sells the trademarked or 
copyrighted goods abroad, “the parallel importation of the goods 
competes on the gray market with the [trademark or copyright] 
holder’s domestic sales.”17 
Finally, in case 3, a U.S. holder of a trademark or copyright may 
authorize an independent foreign manufacturer to make its products.18  
Usually, the U.S. trademark or copyright holder sells or assigns to the 
foreign manufacturer an exclusive right to use the trademark or 
copyright in a particular foreign market, thus conditioning the right of 
use on the foreign manufacturer’s promise not to import the product 
into the United States.19  Again, if the foreign manufacturer or a third 
party imports the goods into the United States, the foreign-
manufactured goods compete on the gray market with the U.S. 
trademark or copyright holder’s domestically produced goods.20 
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 286–87. 
17 Id. at 287. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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II 
VIEWING THE GRAY MARKET THROUGH THE LENS OF TRADEMARK 
AND CUSTOMS LAW 
A.  The Purposes of Trademark Law 
In 1870, Congress passed the first federal law regulating trademark 
registration.21  However, just nine years later, in 1879 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional because it exceeded 
Congress’s power to regulate trademarks, limited by the Commerce 
Clause.22  Congress responded in 1881 by passing a new statute 
governing registration of trademarks used in commerce with the 
Indian tribes and foreign nations, but leaving out interstate 
commerce.23  It was not until 1905 that Congress passed the Federal 
Trademark Act, which is regarded as the first “modern” federal 
trademark registration statute.24  The Act was subjected to a series of 
amendments and modifications,25 and by today’s standards, the 
original 1905 legislation was fairly limited.26 
The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 codified contemporary 
principles of American trademark law.27  “For the first time, Congress 
had passed a law creating substantive, as well as procedural, rights in 
trademarks and unfair competition.”28  From a public policy 
perspective, the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 was intended to 
provide trademark owners with goodwill by providing consumers the 
ability to distinguish among goods of competing manufacturers.29  In 
essence, the Act’s stated purpose was “‘to codify and unify the 
common law of unfair competition and trademark protection.’”30 
According to one authority, trademarks generally perform four 
functions: 
 
21 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 5.3, at 5-6 (4th ed. 2002). 
22 Id. at 5-7 (citing Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). 
23 Id. at 5-7 to 5-8. 
24 Id. at 5-8. 
25 Id. at 5-8 to 5-9. 
26 Id. at 5-8. 
27 Id. at 5-9 to 5-13. 
28 Id. at 5-13. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
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1. [t]o identify one seller’s goods and distinguish them from goods 
sold by others; . . . 2. [t]o signify that all goods bearing the 
trademark come from . . . a single, albeit anonymous, source; . . .   
3. [t]o signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an equal 
level of quality; . . . and 4. [a]s a prime instrument in advertising 
and selling the goods.31 
In addition to the four functions mentioned above, the following 
merits consideration: 
[I]t must also be kept in mind that a trademark is also the objective 
symbol of the good will that a business has built up. . . . Without the 
identification function performed by trademarks, buyers would have 
no way of returning to buy products that they have used and liked.  
If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled “good will,”  
. . . then a trademark is the symbol by which the world can identify 
that good will.32 
The test of infringement in trademark is whether the mark in question 
creates a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.33 
There are two competing theories of trademark rights: (1) the 
universality theory and (2) the territoriality theory.  “[B]ased on 
universality, the trademark represents the good on a world-wide 
basis.”34  “Territoriality provides the trademark holder with a separate 
set of rights and protections in each individual country in which the 
trademark is registered.”35 
B.  First Judicial Encounters with the Gray Market: Apollinaris Co. 
v. Scherer 
The first American case dealing with parallel importation arose in 
1886 in New York.  In Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, Andreas Saxlehner, 
the owner of a mineral spring in Hungary, entered into an exclusive 
contract with the Apollinaris Company to export and sell waters from 
springs in Great Britain and America.36  The waters were known as 
Hunyadi Janos and were trademarked under that name.37  “The waters 
are known as ‘Hunyadi Janos,’ the spring having been christened by 
that name by Saxlehner, and the name as applied to the water having 
 
31 Id. at 3-3 (footnotes omitted). 
32 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
33 See id. at 3-5 to 3-11. 
34 Andrade, supra note 4, at 425. 
35 Id. 
36 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 19 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). 
37 Id. 
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been adopted by [Saxlehner] as a [trademark].”38  To protect their 
prospective rights, Saxlehner and Apollinaris Co. adopted labels to be 
affixed to their bottles bearing the Hunyadi Janos name.39  To further 
protect their rights, Saxlehner’s labels contained the following 
warning: “CAUTION.  This bottle is not intended for export, and if 
exported for sale in Great Britain, her colonies, America, or other 
transmarine places, the public is cautioned against purchasing it.  
ANDREAS SAXLEHNER.”40 
In place of Saxlehner’s cautionary notice, Apollinaris Co. placed 
its own notice on the bottles, stating the following: “Sole exporters.  
The Apollinaris Company, Limited, London.”41 
Saxlehner proceeded to sell Hunyadi Janos water in Germany and 
other parts of the continent in bottles bearing his label.42  Apollinaris 
Co., in bottles bearing its label, sold Hunyadi Janos in Great Britain 
and the United States.  Apollinaris established an agency in the 
United States to aid in its American distribution.43  Soon, Scherer 
began purchasing Hunyadi Janos in continental Europe and exporting 
it to America, where he sold it at prices lower than Apollinaris’s.44 
In denying Apollinaris’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
court held that because the item in question, Hunyadi Janos water, 
was a genuinely trademarked product, Apollinaris’s trademark had 
not been infringed.  The court opined that if Scherer were importing a 
counterfeit product a different result would be in order: an 
injunction.45 
 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  Judge Wallace points out that Scherer “does this after having applied to 
Saxlehner to sell him the water and b[eing] refused and informed by Saxlehner of the 
[Apollinaris’s] rights.”  Id. 
45 Id. at 20 (“There is no exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol or emblematic 
device except to denote the authenticity of the article with which it has become identified 
by association.  The name has no office except to vouch for the genuineness of the thing 
which it distinguishes from all counterfeits; and until it is sought to be used as a false 
token to denote that the product or commodity to which it is applied is the product or 
commodity which it properly authenticates, the law of trade-mark cannot be invoked.”). 
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C.  The Decision that Set the Tone of Debate: A. Bourjois & Co. v. 
Katzel 
Beginning in 1879, successeurs (A. Bourjois & Cie.) sold face 
powder manufactured in France in the United States.46  A. Bourjois & 
Cie., a French company, registered its face powder under the U.S. 
trademark “Java” in 1888.47  It registered the company’s trademark, 
“A. Bourjois & Cie.,” in 1908.48  Finally, A. Bourjois & Cie. 
registered the trademark “Java” on the top and side of its face powder 
box in 1912.49 
In 1913, A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. (A. Bourjois NY), a New York 
corporation, bought the U.S. business, goodwill, and trademarks of A. 
Bourjois & Cie., E. Wertheimer & Cie., Successeurs.50  Under the 
terms of the assignment and purchase of the U.S. business and 
trademarks, A. Bourjois NY imported face powder purchased from A. 
Bourjois & Cie. in bulk from France.51 
Anna Katzel owned and operated a retail pharmacy in New York 
City, from which she sold, in several states, “the same genuine face 
powder manufactured by the French firm, imported by her in its 
original boxes, on which are printed its trade-marks and labels.”52  A. 
Bourjois NY filed an action in Federal District Court alleging that 
Katzel infringed its registered trademark.53  The A. Bourjois & Cie., 
E. Wertheimer & Cie., Successeurs powder that Katzel sold was 
called “Poudre de riz de Java,” which A. Bourjois NY also called it 
until 1916, while A. Bourjois NY’s powder was called “Poudre 
Java.”54   In addition, on the bottom of A. Bourjois NY’s box was the 
following caption: “Trade-Mark Reg. U.S. Pat. Off. Made in 
France—Packed in the U.S.A. by A. Bourjois & Co., Inc., of N.Y., 
Succ’rs in the U.S. to A. Bourjois & Cie. and E. Wertheimer & 
Cie.”55  The district court granted A. Bourjois NY’s motion for a 
 
46 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 689 
(1923). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 539–40. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 540. 
53 See id. at 540. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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preliminary injunction because Katzel’s importation infringed A. 
Bourjois NY’s trademarks.56  Katzel appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.57 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.58  The 
Second Circuit “set on one side all authorities cited [by A. Bourjois 
NY] arising out of sales under the same trade-marks of two different 
competitive articles manufactured by different persons.”59  The 
court’s rationale was that because there were no legal grounds on 
which to hold that A. Bourjois NY’s trademarks had been infringed, 
“the article sold by the plaintiff and covered by its registered trade-
marks is the face powder actually manufactured by the French firm, 
imported in bulk and packed here by the plaintiff, which is the precise 
article imported by the defendant in the French firm’s original boxes 
and sold here.”60  After discussing the case law from the Second 
Circuit related to trademarks,61 the court offered the following 
observation: 
Trade-marks . . . are intended to show without any time limit the 
origin of the goods they mark, so that the owner and the public may 
be protected against the sale of one man’s goods as the goods of 
another man.  If the goods sold are the genuine goods covered by 
the trade-mark, the rights of the owner of the trade-mark are not 
infringed.62 
The debate was not over.  The Second Circuit certified the question 
involved in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel to the U.S. Supreme Court.63  
 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 543. 
59 Id. at 540.  A. Bourjois NY cited to Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 
(1916), and Scandinavia Co. v. Asbestos Co., 257 F. 937 (2d Cir. 1919).  Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 540–43.  The Court discussed Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), Russian Cement Co. v. Frauenhar, 133 F. 518 (2d Cir. 1904), and 
Gretsch Manufacturing Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).  Id. 
62 Id. at 543. 
63 Id. at 544 (per curiam). 
The precise question decided by us has been misapprehended.  The trade-marks 
and labels complained of are those of the French house, and the plaintiff asserts 
that it is selling under them face powder manufactured by the French house in 
France and imported by it in bulk and repacked here.  It treats this repacking as a 
very material consideration.  The defendant says that this is precisely the product 
made by the French house in France and imported by her in the boxes of the 
French house with the same trade-marks and labels, which she is selling here. 
Id. 
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In a remarkably terse three-paragraph opinion, Justice Holmes 
announced the decision of the Court, reversing the Second Circuit and 
reinstating the district court’s finding of infringement and grant of 
preliminary injunction.64 
After briefly recounting the facts,65 the Court held that under the 
then-controlling statute authorizing assignment,66 “[a]fter the sale the 
French manufacturers could not have come to the United States and 
have used their old marks in competition with the plaintiff.”67  Thus, 
by selling to Katzel and by directly and indirectly competing against 
its assignee, A. Bourjois & Cie. and Katzel, by implication, infringed 
upon the trademark rights of A. Bourjois NY.  The Court embraced 
the “territoriality” theory of trademark.68  The “territoriality” theory 
of trademark provides that “[a] U.S. [trademark] registration provides 
protection only in the United States and its territories.”69 
 
64 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690–93 (1923). 
65 Id. at 691 (“The defendant, finding that the rate of exchange enabled her to do so at a 
profit, bought a large quantity of the same powder in France and is selling it here in the 
French boxes which closely resemble those used by the plaintiff . . . . There is no question 
that the defendant infringes the plaintiff’s rights unless the fact that her boxes and powder 
are the genuine product of the French concern gives her a right to sell them in the present 
form.”). 
66 Id. (citing Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 10, 33 Stat. 727). 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 692 (“Ownership of the goods does not carry the right to sell them with a 
specific mark.  It does not necessarily carry the right to sell them at all in a given place.  If 
the goods were patented in the United States a dealer who lawfully bought similar goods 
abroad from one who had a right to make and sell them there could not sell them in the 
United States. . . . The monopoly in that case is more extensive, but we see no sufficient 
reason for holding that the monopoly of a trade mark, so far as it goes, is less complete.  It 
deals with a delicate matter that may be of great value but that easily is destroyed, and 
therefore should be protected with corresponding care.  It is said that the trade mark here is 
that of the French house and truly indicates the origin of the goods.  But that is not 
accurate.  It is the trade mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in law, 
and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff although 
not made by it. . . . It stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods.” 
(citations omitted)). 
69 MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 10 (1999); see also Andrade, 
supra note 4, at 424–27. 
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D.  Congress Responds to the Gray Market: Legislative and 
Administrative Efforts to Stop Parallel Importation 
1.  Section 526 of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 
Congress entered the debate on parallel importation by enacting 
section 526 of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922.70  Section 
526(a) of the Act provides that 
it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any 
merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the 
label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark 
owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or 
organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and 
Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States . . . .71 
Congress enacted section 526 with the full intent of overturning the 
Second Circuit’s holding in Katzel.  In Congress’s view, the Fordney-
McCumber Tariff Act was a measure to protect American 
manufacturers and industry from unfair competitive advantages 
inhering to foreign manufacturers and industry.72  Section 526 was 
 
70 Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 975, repealed by 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (current version at 19 
U.S.C. § 1526 (2006)). 
71 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006). 
72 See S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 1–3 (1922); H.R. REP. NO. 67-248, at 1–2 (1921).  
Regarding the protective nature of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, one 
commentator observed: 
The Republican Party wanted to quickly reverse the low rates of the Underwood-
Simmons Tariff of the Wilson administration.  Protectionism had never died, but 
remained dormant during World War I, and now its supporters could base their 
arguments on both economics and nationalism.  They claimed that the economic 
prosperity which occurred during the war was due mostly to a lack of imports 
and to the abundance of exports.  Now that the war had ended, imports would 
increase, threatening the current economic prosperity.  Why should Americans 
suffer economic hardship, especially after sending our boys to fight in a war that 
we did not start—a war that was supposed to make the world a better place, but 
now seemed a mistake?  Isolationism—keeping out of international affairs, and 
worrying more about your own country—was on the rise in the United States, as 
the Senate, in the last days of the Wilson administration voted against joining the 
League of Nations. Isolationism, nationalism and the concern for continued 
prosperity made it easier for protectionists to press their arguments for a higher 
protective tariff.  These trends led to the passage of Emergency Tariff in 1921 
and to the Fordney-McCumber Tariff a year later.  The rates of these tariffs 
rivaled the protectionist Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, and were considerably 
higher than the Underwood-Simmons Tariff passed in 1913. 
. . . . 
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passed as a “midnight amendment” after only ten minutes of debate.73  
Historically, section 526 was enacted with an eye toward protecting 
foreign trademarks (mostly German-owned trademarks and assets) 
confiscated by the United States during World War I.74  
Unfortunately, as the legislative record reveals, there was a rampant 
misunderstanding among congressmen concerning the holding and 
facts of Katzel.75 
Section 526 was reenacted under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930.  Some scholars insist that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 
was the most restrictive and protectionist tariff legislation passed in 
American history.76 
 
. . . In conclusion, nationalism and isolationism resulted from World War I, 
leading to a return of protectionism, with the passage of the Emergency Tariff in 
1921 and Fordney McCumber Tariff in 1922.  This in turn hurt both the domestic 
and international economies.  Ironically, President Herbert Hoover stayed the 
course—by signing an even more protectionist tariff bill, the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff of 1930.  In the aftermath of the Great Depression and the collapse in 
world trade, the U.S. moved back toward free trade in 1933, when Democratic 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Cordell Hull worked 
to end protectionism through a series of bilateral and later multilateral 
agreements, with foreign countries. 
Edward S. Kaplan, N.Y. City Coll. of Tech. of CUNY, The Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 
1922, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Kaplan.Fordney (last visited July 4, 2010). 
73 See generally 61 CONG. REC. 3383, 3384 (1921) (statement of Rep. Garner) (“Mr. 
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the minority may have until 12 o’clock to-night to 
present their views and that their views may accompany and be printed with the majority 
report . . . It could not possibly interfere with tomorrow if we file our views by 12 o’clock 
to-night.”). 
74 See generally TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK 
LAW 48–54 (1994). 
The unusual willingness of Congress to take up an issue then pending before the 
Supreme Court highlights the matter’s substantial political importance.  
Transcending the dispute between Bourjois and Katzel was a more general 
concern over the fate of certain enemy assets which the United States had 
confiscated during the First World War.  These had included many formerly 
German-owned enterprises located in the United States, which the United States’ 
Alien Property Custodian eventually sold, along with their trademarks and 
goodwill, to American citizens. 
Id. at 48. 
75 See id. at 48–51. 
76 See, e.g., Tobias L. Millrood, Comment, Third Party Intentional Interference with 
International Exclusive Dealing Contracts: An Alternative Solution to the Obstacles in 
Parallel Importation Litigation, 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 359, 364 & n.28 (1994) 
(citing Steven P. Kersner & Donald S. Stein, Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the 
Importation of Grey Market Goods: From Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry, 11 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 251, 260 n.48 (1986)). 
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The language of section 526 appears to be plain and unequivocal: it 
is unlawful to import merchandise bearing the registered trademark of 
a U.S. citizen.  In cases where the provisions of section 526 are 
violated, the goods are subject to seizure by the U.S. Customs Service 
and the violator is subject to money damages, obliteration of the 
trademark, and the costs of reexporting the goods.77  The penalties 
appear to be harsh and severe for parallel importers.  Section 526 has 
two remedies for the victims of parallel importation: first, through 
administrative and regulatory enforcement within the Customs 
Service and second, through judicial interpretation, construction, and 
manipulation of the statutory language. 
2.  Customs Service Enforcement of Section 526 
a.  Pre-1999 Customs Service Enforcement of Section 526 
Prior to February 1999, when new regulations were adopted and 
finalized, despite section 526’s prohibition of the importation of 
trademarked goods, gray marketers found safe harbor under the 
loopholes created by administrative and regulatory enforcement on 
the part of the Customs Service.78  Customs regulation 19 C.F.R. § 
133.21 served as the primary mechanism through which section 526 
was enforced.  Within section 133.21(c), there were major exceptions 
to section 526, which allowed for gray market importation.79 
Under the “same person” exception, trademarked merchandise may 
be imported into the United States if both the foreign and U.S. 
trademarks were owned by the same person or business entity.80  
Under the “common ownership or control” exception, trademarked 
merchandise may be imported into the United States where the 
domestic (American) and foreign trademarks are the property of 
“related companies.”81  The “common ownership or control” 
exception provides that where the “foreign and domestic trademark 
owners are parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to    
. . . common control[,]” the articles may be imported.82  Previously, 
 
77 19 U.S.C. § 1526(b), (c), (e), (f) (2006). 
78 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1998) (amended in 1999); see also HIEBERT, supra note 74, 
at 74–79 (providing a concise and cogent discussion of Custom Service regulations under 
section 526). 
79 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c). 
80 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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the “authorized use” exception permitted the importation of articles 
bearing a trademark authorized by the U.S. trademark holder.83  
Finally, the “written consent” exception allowed for gray market 
importation where the trademark owner gave written consent for the 
importation of gray market articles.84  Prior to 1999, as far as 
trademark law is concerned, the Customs Service interpretation and 
enforcement of section 526 had been the flashpoint in the battle to 
exclude parallel imports.  Over the years, a number of litigants have 
brought actions seeking to clarify the interpretation and enforcement 
of section 526.85  Virtually all litigants have been unsuccessful.86 
b.  Post-1999 Customs Service Enforcement of Section 526: The 
Lever Brothers Rule 
On February 24, 1999, the Customs Service issued final rules that 
amended 19 C.F.R. section 133.87  The new regulations restricted the 
importation, in specific circumstances, of gray market goods that are 
“physically and materially different” from trademarked goods and 
items authorized for sale by a U.S. trademark owner.88  The new 
regulations became effective on March 26, 1999.89  The new 
regulations are known as the Lever Brothers rules or collectively as 
Lever-rule protection90 because they are rooted in the famous 1993 
Lever Brothers Corp. v. United States case.91 
The Lever rule contains guidelines for determining whether gray 
market goods produced by a company affiliated with a U.S. trademark 
owner are “restricted gray market articles”92 or “restricted gray 
 
83 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3). 
84 Id. § 133.21(c)(6). 
85 See generally infra Part II.D.3 (discussing and analyzing major cases seeking clarity 
with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1998)). 
86 See Part II.D.3. 
87 See generally 64 Fed. Reg. 9058 (Feb. 24, 1999) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See generally 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(e)(3) (2009) (citing Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 
981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
91 Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
92 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a).  A “restricted gray market article” is a “foreign-made [article] 
bearing a genuine trademark or trade name identical with or substantially indistinguishable 
from one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or 
association created or organized within the United States and imported without the 
authorization of the U.S. owner.”  Id. 
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market goods,”93 and thereby eligible for seizure.94  At a baseline, the 
“restricted gray market articles” must possess a “physical and 
material difference.”95  This is known as the “physical and material 
difference” standard.96  The Customs Service uses a nonexclusive list 
of five categories or guidelines to determine whether goods are 
“physically and materially different.”97  These five categories include 
the following: 
(1) The specific composition of both the authorized and gray 
market product(s) (including chemical composition); 
(2) Formulation, product construction, structure, or composite 
product components, of both the authorized and gray market 
product; 
(3) Performance [and] . . . operational characteristics of both the 
authorized and gray market product; 
(4) Differences resulting from legal or regulatory requirements, 
certification, etc.; 
(5) Other distinguishing and explicitly defined factors that would 
likely result in consumer deception or confusion as proscribed 
under applicable law.98 
U.S. trademark owners must demonstrate with “particularity” that 
one or more of these five categories of physical or material 
differences exists.99  In order to receive Lever-rule protection, owners 
are required to provide “competent evidence” to the Customs Service 
 
93 See id.  “Restricted gray market goods” are goods that bear 
a genuine trademark or trade name which is: (1) . . . [a]pplied by a licensee 
(including a manufacturer) independent of the U.S. owner[;] or (2) . . . [a]pplied 
under the authority of a foreign trademark or trade name owner other than the 
U.S. owner, a parent or subsidiary of the U.S. owner, or a party otherwise subject 
to common ownership or control with the U.S. owner . . . , from whom the U.S. 
owner acquired the domestic title, or to whom the U.S. owner sold the foreign 
title(s); or (3) . . . [a]pplied by the U.S. owner, a parent or subsidiary of the U.S. 
owner, or a party otherwise subject to common ownership or control with the 
U.S. owner . . . , to goods that the Customs Service has determined to be 
physically and materially different [under the Lever-rule] from the articles 
authorized by the U.S. trademark owner for importation or sale in the U.S. 
Id. 
94 See generally 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.2(e), 133.23(a), (e) (2009). 
95 Id. § 133.2(e). 
96 Id. 
97 See id. § 133.2(e)(1)–(5). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. § 133.2(e). 
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that one or more of the five categories of physical or material 
differences outlined above exists.100  A U.S. trademark owner must 
submit a request to receive Lever-rule protection.101  The Customs 
Service publishes a list of products subject to Lever-rule protection, 
along with a list of physical and material differences, in the Customs 
Bulletin.102  If Lever-rule protection is granted, the Customs Service 
then publishes a notice in the Customs Bulletin that a trademark has 
received protection with regard to a specific product.103  Goods 
granted Lever-rule protection are denied entry and are subject to 
detention.104 
Where “physical and material differences” exist among goods and 
Lever-rule protection is granted, denial of entry and detention will not 
occur if the goods bear 
a conspicuous and legible label designed to remain on the product 
until the first point of sale to a retail consumer in the United States 
stating that: “This product is not a product authorized by the United 
States trademark owner for importation and is physically and 
materially different from the authorized product.”  The label must 
be in close proximity to the trademark as it appears in its most 
prominent location on the article itself or the retail package or 
container.  [Additionally,] [o]ther information designed to dispel 
consumer confusion may also be added.105 
As the Customs Service has articulated, labeling of “physically and 
materially different” goods offers consumer protection and greater 
product differentiation.106  After denial of entry and detention, the 
importer has the burden of proof to show that the goods are identical, 
or that an exception applies, or where “physically and materially 
different” goods subject to Lever-rule protection are involved, the 
importer may simply choose to add a cautionary label like the one 
described above and obtain release of the goods.107 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. § 133.2(f). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. § 133.25. 
105 Id. § 133.23(b). 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 95–97. 
107 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(d). 
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3.  Judicial Interpretations of Section 526 
a.  Vivitar Corp. v. United States 
In Vivitar v. United States, Vivitar Corporation, a California-based 
manufacturer of photographic equipment, brought an action in the 
Court of International Trade seeking a declaratory judgment 
invalidating the Customs Service’s interpretation of section 526 and 
regulation (under 19 C.F.R. § 133.21) allowing importation of any 
gray market goods.108  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
Court of International Trade ruled in the government’s favor, 
upholding the Customs Service interpretation of section 526 under the 
regulations promulgated at section l33.2l.109  Vivitar appealed this 
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
The facts demonstrated that Vivitar had “little or no manufacturing 
facilities of its own, but rather . . . its products [were] manufactured to 
specification by various foreign manufacturers, principally in 
Japan.”110  Vivitar had its U.S. trademark “VIVITAR” displayed or 
affixed on its equipment.111  Vivitar established an extensive 
worldwide marketing and distribution system whereby Vivitar 
retained the U.S. market, and various foreign subsidiary corporations 
controlled marketing and distribution abroad.112  In the United States, 
Vivitar set up a channel of independent, authorized dealerships that 
resold Vivitar products to the public.113  Vivitar maintained price 
differentials between its U.S. and foreign markets.114  As a result, this 
price differential made it profitable for discounters to import Vivitar 
equipment from foreign markets to the United States.115  As the court 
noted: “Vivitar seeks to justify its authorized dealers’ higher prices as 
compared to those of discount houses by its extensive advertising 
costs, warranty costs, and other legitimate business expenses 
 
108 The decisions of the Court of International Trade on jurisdiction and the merits of 
Vivitar Corp. v. United States are reported at 7 Ct. Int’l Trade 170 (1984) and 8 Ct. Int’l 
Trade 109 (1984). 
109 Vivitar, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 109. 
110 Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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necessary to promote its VIVITAR products in the U.S. and maintain 
its goodwill in the mark.”116 
Since no trial was conducted, Vivitar did not challenge any specific 
import transaction in asserting that the Customs Service regulation of 
section 1526 was unreasonable.117  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals 
held that 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 was “a reasonable exercise of Customs’ 
power to exclude under the statute as a matter of agency initiated 
enforcement.”118  In holding that the Customs Service is not required 
to exclude all gray market goods under section 526, the court noted: 
“Congress could not have foreseen all possibilities in international 
trade relationships at the time of enacting the statute.  The variations 
of the grey market are myriad.”119  The court concluded its 
examination of section 526—and the regulation under 19 C.F.R. § 
133.21—by stating:  
Where protection under the statute is unclear or depends upon 
resolution of complex factual situations, Customs may decline to 
impose sua sponte the extreme sanction of exclusion and leave such 
cases for initial determination by the district courts under the private 
remedies provided to the trademark owner in § 1526(c).120 
In the future, this is exactly what other litigants would do. 
b.  Olympus Corp. v. United States 
In Olympus Corp. v. United States, Olympus Corporation 
(Olympus), a New York-based, wholly owned subsidiary of Olympus 
Optical Co., a Japanese photographic company, brought an action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief to determine the validity of the 
Customs Service regulation under section 526.121  Thwarting 
Olympus’s efforts to eradicate gray market importation, the district 
court held that the Customs Service regulation and interpretation of 
section 526 was valid.122 
 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. at 1555 (“Since the factual situations involving grey market importations vary 
widely and not all may be in violation of § l526(a), we hold that Customs is not required to 
provide for automatic exclusion beyond that set forth in its current regulations.”). 
119 Id. at 1569–70. 
120 Id. at 1570. 
121 Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 316 (2d Cir. 1986). 
122 Id. 
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On appeal, holding that the “Customs regulation is valid,”123 the 
Second Circuit reasoned that the “regulations have . . . been 
sufficiently consistent to warrant a finding that longstanding 
administrative interpretation confirms . . . [the Government’s] reading 
of the statute.”124  The court went on to add “[w]hile [it] find[s] the 
regulation of questionable wisdom . . . congressional acquiescence in 
the longstanding administrative interpretation of the statute 
legitimates that interpretation as an exercise of Customs’ enforcement 
discretion.”125  The Second Circuit was quick to point out that 
although the Customs Service regulation was valid, the regulations 
did not limit the reach of protection under section 526: the trademark 
holder still has rights under section 526, namely private remedies 
under section 526(c) to exclude goods.126 
c.  Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. 
United States 
In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. 
United States (COPIAT), the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of 
American Trademarks, a trade association consisting of American 
companies holding U.S. trademarks, plus two of its members, Cattier, 
Inc., and Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd., brought yet another action 
challenging the validity of the Customs Service regulation of section 
526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and section 42 of the Lanham 
Trademark Act of 1946.127 
At the district court level, consistent with prior precedent, on cross-
motions for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss, the district 
court upheld the Customs Service regulations, holding that they were 
a “sufficiently reasonable” interpretation of the governing statutes.128  
Further, the court observed that section 133.21 was “supported by the 
legislative history, judicial decisions, legislative acquiescence, and the 
long-standing consistent policy of the Customs Service.”129  The 
 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 319. 
125 Id. at 320. 
126 Id. 
127 See Coal. to Pres. the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 
844, 846–47 (D.D.C. 1984); 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006). 
128 Coal. to Pres. the Integrity of Am. Trademarks, 598 F. Supp. at 852. 
129 Id. 
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district court’s view on the validity of the Customs regulations was in 
accord with those expressed by other courts.130 
The COPIAT case started out at a mundane pitch in the district 
court: there, the court merely followed precedent.  The tectonic shift 
took place at the circuit court level, where the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit heard the case on appeal.  Judge Silberman, 
writing for the court, held that “the [section 133.21] regulations 
simply cannot be squared with Section 526 and are thus invalid.”131  
The court did not reach whether the regulations were consistent with 
section 42 of the Lanham Act.132  The court reasoned that based on a 
plain language reading of section 526, all parallel importation was 
prohibited; facially and linguistically, no exceptions were provided 
for in the statute, thus, allowing Customs Service exceptions ran 
counter to the statutory language and intent.  The court expressed this 
opinion when it wrote: “Section 526 does not, on its face, admit of 
any exceptions based upon the relationship of the American and 
foreign trademark owners or upon whether the American owner has 
authorized the use of the trademark abroad.”133  The court entered 
into an extensive examination of the legislative history and intent 
behind section 526 to buttress its position.134  For the court, this 
examination revealed that Congress’s intent in enacting section 526 
was the unequivocal prohibition of all parallel importation.  Thus, 
“‘that is the end of the matter.’”135 
From its review, the COPIAT court found that “the Customs 
Service’s interpretation of Section 526 does not display the necessary 
‘thoroughness, validity, and consistency’ to merit judicial 
acceptance.”136  The court placed great reliance in reaching its 
decision on the fact that section 133.21 had not been adopted 
 
130 See, e.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Vivitar 
Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. U.S. 
Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983). 
131 Coal. to Pres. the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 907 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
132 Id. (“In light of this holding, it is unnecessary to decide whether the regulations 
would be consistent with Section 42 standing alone.”). 
133 Id. at 907–08. 
134 Id. at 908–16. 
135 Id. at 908 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
136 Id. at 916 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981)). 
 2009] The Graying of the American Manufacturing Economy 1163 
contemporaneously with section 526.137  Moreover, the Customs 
Service in the court’s view showed poor articulation, vacillation, and 
unclear reasoning both in adopting section 133.21 and in its 
regulatory enforcement.138  Finally, having reached the conclusion 
that the regulation was invalid, the court remanded the case to the 
district court with instructions to issue a declaratory judgment holding 
section 133.21(c)(1)–(3) unlawful.139 
COPIAT caused a split of authority among the circuits.  Olympus 
and Vivitar in effect endorsed gray market goods by upholding the 
Customs Service regulation.  COPIAT had the opposite effect by 
invalidating the Customs Service regulation and holding that section 
526 categorically denied entry of all parallel imports.  By creating this 
split, COPIAT stirred the waves so much that Supreme Court 
intervention in the gray market debate became inevitable. 
d.  K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., on a consolidated appeal and 
hearing, the Supreme Court rehashed the issues brought up on appeal 
in COPIAT, namely whether the Customs Service’s regulation, 
section 133.21(c)(1)–(3), was a valid administrative interpretation of 
§ 526.140  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “resolve a conflict 
among the Courts of Appeals.”141  Since the COPIAT court did not 
reach section 42 of the Lanham Act, neither did the Supreme Court on 
review.142  The Court was charged with determining the validity of 
three provisions of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c).  A majority of the Court 
 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 916–17. 
[T]he first set of Customs regulations announcing this policy appeared to 
implement another statute, then-Section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 
rather than Section 526.  Nor has the Customs Service’s interpretation since that 
time been supported by anything more than poorly articulated and vacillating 
reasoning. . . . At least since the 1950s, Customs’ interpretation has been driven 
in large part by a perceived need to obviate the antitrust problems raised by a 
multinational corporation’s use of an American subsidiary to preclude 
competition in the distribution of its trademarked product. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
139 Id. at 918. 
140 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 290 n.3 (“[A]lso asserted that the Customs Service regulation was inconsistent 
with § 42 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act . . . . That issue is not before us.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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held that the common-control exception under subsections 
133.21(c)(1)–(2) was consistent with section 526.143  In the Court’s 
view, subsections 133.21(c)(1)–(2) were “permissible constructions 
designed to resolve statutory ambiguities.”144 
However, a different majority held that the authorized-use 
exception, subsection § l33.21(c)(3), was inconsistent with section 
526.  The Court held that the “authorized-use” exception was invalid 
because: “[T]he regulation denies a domestic trademark holder the 
power to prohibit the importation of goods made by an independent 
foreign manufacturer where the domestic trademark holder has 
authorized the foreign manufacturer to use the trademark.”145  
Further, “[u]nder no reasonable construction of the statutory language 
can goods made in a foreign country by an independent foreign 
manufacturer be removed from the purview of the statute.”146  For 
these reasons, the Court held section 133.21(c)(3) was in “conflict 
with the unequivocal language of the statute” and severable from the 
rest of the regulation.147 
E.  Sections 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act 
Over the years, registered U.S. trademark holders have attempted 
to have gray market goods excluded under sections 32 and 42 of the 
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946.  Pursuant to section 32 of the Act, 
the U.S. holder of a registered trademark may proceed to exclude any 
“reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of their mark, 
imported without their consent, that is “likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive.”148  Further, section 42 prohibits the 
importation of any article of merchandise that “copies” or “simulates” 
a registered U.S. trademark.149 
 
143 Id. at 291. 
144 Id. at 292. 
145 Id. at 294. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). 
149 § 1124.  This section provides, in pertinent part: 
Except as provided in subsection (d) of section 1526 . . . no article of imported 
merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of any domestic 
manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located 
in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar 
privileges to citizens of the United States, or which shall copy or simulate a 
trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter or shall 
bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is 
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1.  Administrative Interpretations of Section 42 of the Lanham Act 
Most important, section 42 of the Lanham Act falls under the same 
regulatory authority as section 526.  Thus, under the authority of 
Customs Service regulation section 133.21(c), the same exceptions 
that allow for the importation of gray market goods under section 526 
apply to section 42 as well.  In terms of litigation, registered U.S. 
trademark holders trying to attack gray market goods in court under 
section 42 have largely failed, just as they have under section 526. 
2.  Judicial Interpretations of Sections 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act 
a.  Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International Corp. 
Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. (Monte Carlo), a New York corporation, 
entered into a contract with Daewoo Industrial Company, Ltd. 
(Daewoo), a South Korean corporation, to buy nearly three thousand 
“men’s dress shirts manufactured to its specifications and bearing its 
label[s].”150  When the shirts arrived in America, Monte Carlo 
rejected them because they had arrived too late to be sold during 
Christmas.151  Subsequently, Daewoo’s American subsidiary, 
Daewoo International (American) Corp. (Daewoo America), bought 
the shirts from Daewoo.152  Daewoo America began selling the shirts 
to discount retailers, bearing Monte Carlo’s labels and plastic bags, 
without Monte Carlo’s permission.153  “Monte Carlo sued Daewoo     
. . . for breach of contract, common-law trademark and tradename 
infringement, [tortious] interference with [a] business [relationship], 
conversion, violation of a provision of the California Unfair Practices 
Act . . . and violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1127.”154  Daewoo entered a cross-complaint for breach of 
contract.155 
 
manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any foreign 
country or locality other than the country or locality in which it is in fact 
manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States 
. . . . 
150 Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int’l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1055–56. 
154 Id. at 1056 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
155 Id. 
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At trial, “the jury entered a verdict for Monte Carlo on the breach 
of contract claim,” awarding $79,073 for lost profits.156  On the 
trademark claim, the jury awarded Monte Carlo $1,582,735 in general 
compensatory damages, $70,048 in special compensatory damages, 
and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.157  On the Lanham Act claim, 
the court directed a verdict for Daewoo; Daewoo moved for a new 
trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.158  The court granted a 
new trial on the trademark infringement claims, and before the new 
trial, Daewoo won a motion for summary judgment.159  The district 
court held that “‘[t]he sale of the Monte Carlo shirts with the Monte 
Carlo labels intact could not as a matter of law deceive or confuse the 
public concerning the source and origin of the shirts.’”160 
On appeal, the question before the court “was whether an action 
would lie in trademark for Daewoo’s unauthorized sale of genuine 
Monte Carlo shirts.”161  The court noted that “[a] showing of likely 
buyer confusion as to the source, origin, or sponsorship of goods is 
part of a cause of action for infringement of a registered 
trademark.”162  On the Lanham Act claim, the court held there was no 
confusion as the goods were genuine and observed: 
The goods sold by Daewoo were not imitations of Monte Carlo 
shirts; they were the genuine product, planned and sponsored by 
Monte Carlo and produced for it on contract for future sale.  The 
shirts were not altered or changed from the date of their 
manufacture to the date of their sale. . . . Their source was Monte 
Carlo; the absence of Monte Carlo’s authorization of the discount 
retailers to sell does not alter this.163 
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. (alteration in original). 
161 Id. at 1057. 
162 Id. at 1058 (citing Carson Mfg. Co. v. Carsonite Int’l Corp., 686 F.2d 665, 669–70 
(9th  Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1983); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 
632 F.2d 817, 821–22 (9th  Cir. 1980); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 550 F. Supp. 
1056, 1060–61 (C.D. Cal. 1982)). 
163 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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b.  Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. 
In Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., Masel Supply 
Co. appealed an injunction order forbidding it from distributing 
photographic products bearing the trademark Bell & Howell.164 
Bell & Howell was the registered owner of three trademarks 
bearing the Mamiya label.165  Mamiya Camera Co. (Mamiya 
Camera), a Japanese corporation, manufactured photographic 
equipment in Japan.166  Mamiya Camera sold the equipment to an 
exclusive worldwide distributor, J. Osawa & Co. Ltd. (Osawa & Co.), 
a Japanese corporation.167  Bell & Howell distributed, marketed, and 
sold the equipment in the United States.168  Ninety-three percent of 
Bell & Howell stock was owned by Osawa USA, a New York 
corporation wholly owned by Osawa & Co., the Japanese 
corporation.169  Bell & Howell’s packaging, warranty, and price 
policies were controlled by Osawa & Co.170 
In 1980, Bell & Howell spent more than $5 million to promote and 
advertise Mamiya products locally and nationally in the United 
States.171  Masel, a New York-based camera wholesaler, began 
purchasing and importing Mamiya cameras from an international 
dealer in Hong Kong that purchased them from Osawa & Co.172  Bell 
& Howell alleged that Masel’s cameras confused consumers because 
they came without warranties, and that Masel’s cameras sold in 
competition with Bell & Howell’s cameras infringed Bell & Howell’s 
trademark and goodwill.173 
In vacating the district court’s grant of preliminary injunction, the 
Second Circuit ruled that Bell & Howell could show no irreparable 
injury “since the consumer can be made aware by, among other 
things, labels on the camera boxes or notices in advertisements as to 
whether the cameras are sold with or without warranties.”174  On the 
 
164 Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 43 (2d Cir. 1983). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 44. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 43. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 43–44. 
174 Id. at 46. 
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facts, the court noted that Bell & Howell failed to show that 
consumers would be misled about their camera purchases with 
Masel’s camera equipment on the market.175  Other courts have 
reached similar results.176 
c.  Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc. 
In Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, 
Inc., the makers of Cabbage Patch Kids brought an action to enjoin 
the importation of trademarked goods manufactured in Spain.177  
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. (OAA), sold its dolls in the 
United States through “adoption centers” located primarily in 
specialty stores and fine department stores.178  Purchasers of Cabbage 
Patch Dolls received “birth certificates” and “adoption papers,” which 
were to be filled out by the “parent” of the doll who, in turn, takes an 
“oath of adoption.”179  The adoption papers were registered in a 
computer by OAA, and on the Cabbage Patch Kid’s first birthday, it 
received a “birthday card.”180  This elaborate marketing system 
established by OAA constituted an “‘important element of the 
mystique of the [Cabbage Patch Kids] dolls, which has substantially 
contributed to their enormous popularity and commercial 
success.’”181 
OAA, the registered U.S. trademark owner of Cabbage Patch Kids, 
entered into a territorially restrictive license agreement with Jesmar, a 
Spanish manufacturer, to produce and distribute Cabbage Patch Kids 
 
175 Id. 
176 See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1987).  In 
NEC Electronics, a chip manufacturer sued a gray market importer under section 32 of the 
Lanham Act, applying a rationale similar to that applied under section 42 in Olympus, and 
the court noted:  
[T]he Olympus court concluded that section 42 of the Lanham Act . . . barring 
importation of goods that ‘copy or simulate’ a trademark, did not apply to 
genuine goods except in cases presenting the same ‘equities’ as Katzel. . . . 
[Thus,] [w]here the American trademark owner is a wholly-owned and controlled 
subsidiary of the foreign manufacturer, neither of the Katzel rationales applies.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
177 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 70 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada 
Elecs., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 928, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
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(the “Spanish Kids”) primarily in Spain.182  Under the licensing 
agreement, “Jesmar agreed not to make, sell, or authorize any sale of 
the [Spanish Kids] outside its licensed territory and to sell only to 
those purchasers who would agree not to use or resell the [Spanish 
Kids] outside the licensed territory.”183  Jesmar’s Spanish Kids, 
although bearing the U.S. trademark, differed from Cabbage Patch 
Kids because their “adoption papers” were in Spanish.184 
Granada Electronics, Inc. (Granada), imported the Spanish Kids 
into the United States, directly competing with OAA.185  OAA 
brought suit under section 32 of the Lanham Act to enjoin Granada’s 
importation of Spanish Kids.  Affirming the district court’s 
injunction, the Second Circuit concluded that “Jesmar’s dolls were 
not intended to be sold in the United States and, most importantly, 
were materially different from . . . Cabbage Patch Kids dolls sold in 
the United States.”186  The Second Circuit enjoined importation of the 
Spanish Kids by Granada, reasoning the goods were not “genuine” 
because they “differ from the [American] dolls and were not 
authorized for sale in the United States.”187 
The court held that under section 32 of the Lanham Act consumer 
confusion could be shown.188  The court noted: 
There is a very real difference in the product itself—the foreign 
language adoption papers and birth certificate, coupled with the 
United States fulfillment houses’ inability or unwillingness to 
process Jesmar’s adoption papers or mail adoption certificates and 
birthday cards to Jesmar doll owners, and the concomitant inability 
of consumers to “adopt” the dolls.189 
Thus, “this difference . . . creates the confusion over the source of 
the product and results in a loss of OAA’s . . . good will.”190 
 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 73. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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F.  Section 337 
According to the terms of section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 
l930,191 the International Trade Commission (ITC) can sanction 
“unlawful activities” that constitute “unfair acts in . . . 
importation.”192  Section 337(b) provides the ITC with the authority 
to investigate “alleged violation[s]” that constitute “unfair practices” 
in trade.193  Under section 337(d), when the ITC determines that a 
violation of section 337 has occurred, the ITC may exclude the 
“articles concerned . . . from entry into the United States.”194  Finally, 
once the ITC determines that a violation of section 337 has occurred, 
the ITC must transmit a copy of its determination to the President; the 
President has the discretion to disapprove of the determination before 
the end of sixty days, overturning the determination for “policy 
 
191 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).  This section provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions 
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the 
Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of law, 
as provided in this section: 
 . . . . 
 (B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the 
sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or 
consignee, of articles that— 
 (i) infringe a valid and enforceable . . . United States copyright 
registered under Title 17 . . . 
  . . . . 
 (C) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the 
sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or 
consignee, of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States 
trademark registered under the Trademark Act of 1946 . . . . 
(2) Subparagraphs (B), (C) . . . of paragraph (1) apply only if an industry in the 
United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, 
trademark, or mask work concerned, exists or is in the process of being 
established. 
192 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A). 
193 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1). 
194 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1); see, e.g., Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 
F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Thus, gray market law is not concerned with where the 
good was manufactured, nor is it concerned with whether the trademark owner controlled 
the manufacture of the product or authorized the use of the trademark on that product in 
another country.  Instead, gray market law is concerned with whether the trademark owner 
has authorized use of the trademark on that particular product in the United States and thus 
whether the trademark owner has control over the specific characteristics associated with 
the trademark in the United States.”). 
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reasons.”195  Section 337 serves as yet another statutory mechanism 
through which domestic trademark and copyright holders have tried 
to uphold their intellectual property rights.  For the most part, section 
337 has proved to be an effective remedy for U.S. industries.196  
However, jurisprudentially, the single most important case concerning 
gray market importation turned out in favor of parallel importers. 
Duracell, the large battery manufacturer, brought the gray market 
importation of its batteries from Belgium to the attention of the ITC.  
On November 5, 1984, the ITC determined that the importation of 
Duracell batteries on the gray market was a violation of section 337 
causing substantial injury to Duracell.197  On January 4, 1985, within 
sixty days of receiving the ITC’s determination, President Ronald 
Reagan disapproved the ITC’s determination.198  Duracell appealed 
the President’s disapproval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, in Duracell, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission.199  Duracell called on the court to determine “whether 
the President’s disapproval was for policy reasons, as required by the 
statute.”200  The court did not reach this question.  On more technical 
legal grounds, the court dismissed Duracell’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.201  At first glance, the ITC was prepared to take a strong 
stance against parallel importation.202  However, President Reagan 
cited departmental review of the issue of parallel importation and the 
formulation of a “cohesive policy” as policy reasons for his 
disapproval of the ITC’s determination.203 
 
195 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2). 
196 See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 800–03 (3d  ed. 1995). 
197 Duracell, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 778 F.2d 1578, 1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(citing In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (1984)). 
198 Id. at 1580. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1580–82. 
202 See id. 
203 Id. at 1581. 
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III 
GRAY MARKETS AND COPYRIGHTED GOODS 
A.  Copyrighted Goods: The Copyright Act of 1976 
In similar fashion to U.S. patent law, “federal copyright law owes 
its existence to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the [U.S.] 
Constitution.”204  Clause 8 “permits Congress to secure to inventors 
for limited times the exclusive right to their discoveries, and to 
‘authors’ the exclusive right to their ‘writings.’”205  “Analogous to the 
patent law, the principal purpose of the copyright law is to recognize 
and protect the rights of ‘authors’ in their intellectual works and thus 
supply the incentive for the creation and dissemination of such 
works.”206  Copyright holders are given the right to enjoin 
infringement if their work is copied.  “Copyright law is essentially a 
system of property.”207  Under section 106 of the Copyright Act, the 
holder of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, 
perform, display, publish, and adapt the copyrighted work.208  Those 
“exclusive rights” are subject to several exceptions, embodied in 
sections 107 through 122 of the Act.  The right to distribute 
 
204 EARL W. KINTNER & JACK LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 339 
(2d ed. 1982). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (4th ed. 
1993). 
208 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  This section reads, in pertinent part: 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has 
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
 (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
 (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
 (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
 (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; 
 (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted 
work publicly; and 
 (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly 
by means of a digital audio transmission. 
Id. 
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copyrighted works granted by section 106(3), is expressly limited by 
section 109 of the Copyright Act.  Section 109(a) states: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (3), the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any 
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of 
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord.”209  This limitation represents what is 
known as the “first sale doctrine” through which a restraint on 
alienation occurs once the copyright owner has sold the first copy of a 
copyrighted work, triggering future restrictions on sale by 
possessors.210 
The law appears to be clear: (a) copyright owners are given 
important exclusive rights to control distribution of their copyrighted 
material, up to a point; and (b) subject to the limitations imposed 
under section 109(a), third parties who gain possession of a 
copyrighted item can sell or dispose of that copy.211  Unfortunately, 
unwilling or unable to leave well enough alone, Congress muddied 
the waters by inserting section 602 into the Copyright Act.212 
Section 602(a) prohibits the importation into the United States 
“without the authority of the owner of copyright . . . copies or 
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United 
States[, which are] an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute 
copies or phonorecords under section 106.”213 
At the junction of sections 109 and 602, the nexus between parallel 
importation and copyright comes into play.  In effect, Congress 
planted a minefield.  Contradiction is ripe in sections 109 and 602.  
On one hand, section 109(a) appears to give possessors of a 
copyrighted work the right to sell or dispose of the work.  On the 
other hand with respect to international acquisition, the possessor of 
the copyrighted work must have the authority of the copyright owner 
to distribute the work. 
This later contradiction set the stage for inevitable litigation.  Most 
of the litigation has focused on reconciling section 109 with section 
602.  Only one case has come before the Supreme Court over the 
 
209 § 109(a). 
210 See, e.g., Judith Klerman Smith, Comment, The Computer Software Rental Act: 
Amending the “First Sale Doctrine” to Protect Computer Software Copyright, 20 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1613, 1624–25 (1987) (defining the first sale doctrine). 
211 § 109(a). 
212 See § 602. 
213 § 602(a)(1). 
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incongruence of sections 109 and 602, Quality King Distributors, Inc. 
v. L’anza Research International, Inc.214  Before looking at Quality 
King, it is important to look first at earlier decisions that set the stage 
for the case. 
B.  Judicial Interpretation of the Copyright Act 
1.  Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music 
Distributors, Inc. 
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music 
Distributors, Inc. (Scorpio), 215 the conflict between sections 109 and 
602 came into focus.  Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
(Columbia), a New York corporation, owned “copyrights to six sound 
recordings, copies of which compris[ed] the subject matter of [the] 
copyright infringement case” in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc.216  “On . . . January 1, 1981, CBS-
Sony, Inc. [CBS-Sony], a Japanese corporation, entered into two 
written agreements with Vicor Music Corporation (Vicor), a 
Philippines corporation, by which Vicor was authorized to 
manufacture and sell . . . phonorecords exclusively in the 
Philippines.”217  Columbia, which had retained the U.S. copyrights 
for the recordings, “consented to the agreement between CBS-Sony 
and Vicor.”218  CBS-Sony and Vicor agreed that, following 
termination of the agreements, Vicor would have sixty days to 
liquidate its stock of phonorecords.219 
On November 2, 1981, after giving notice, CBS-Sony terminated 
the manufacturing and licensing agreement with Vicor.220  However, 
prior to that date on June 12, 1981, Scorpio Music Distributors, based 
in Pennsylvania, entered into an agreement to purchase several 
thousand phonorecords from International Traders, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation.221  Approximately six thousand records ordered from 
International Traders were copies of the recordings owned under 
 
214 See 98 F.3d 1109 (1996). 
215 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Penn. 1983). 
216 Id. at 47. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
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copyright by Columbia.222  “International Traders bought the 
phonorecords from Rainbow Music, Inc., a Philippines corporation, 
which had purchased them from Vicor” before the sixty-day 
liquidation period had expired.223 
On February 1, 1982, Columbia sued Scorpio alleging that, in 
violation of section 602(a), Scorpio had illegally imported the 
phonorecords without the consent and authorization of Columbia.224  
After discovery, Columbia filed a motion for summary judgment and 
Scorpio filed a cross-motion for dismissal.225  Scorpio argued that 
under the first sale doctrine, applied through the sale from Vicor to 
Rainbow, Scorpio had not infringed Columbia’s copyright.226  
Scorpio alleged that “§ 109(a) supersedes any relevance § 602 
otherwise might have to the case.”227  Granting the motion for 
summary judgment in Columbia’s favor, the court noted that 
Scorpio’s 
contentions would be more persuasive were it not for the phrase—
lawfully made under this title—in § 109(a) [that] the section grants 
first sale protection to the third party buyer of copies which have 
been legally manufactured and sold within the United States and not 
to purchasers of imports such as are involved here.228 
The court reasoned that: 
[D]eclaring legal the act of purchasing from a United States 
importer who . . . buys recordings which have been liquidated 
overseas, would undermine the purpose of the statute.  The 
copyright owner would be unable to exercise control over copies of 
the work which entered the American market in competition with 
copies lawfully manufactured and distributed under this title.229 
The Scorpio court based its rationale on the fact that the 
phonorecords were produced abroad and the sales occurred abroad, 
thereby bringing the activity under the purview of section 602.230  
 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 48. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 49. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 See id. 
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“The court concluded that ‘lawfully made under this title’ meant 
made within the United States.”231 
The Scorpio decision provided ammunition to copyright owners in 
the battle to exclude gray market imports.  The first round resulted in 
a victory for copyright owners.  In the second round, copyright 
owners would not be so fortunate. 
2.  The Third Circuit Weighs in on the Gray Market: Sebastian 
International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd. 
In Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district 
court’s order issuing a preliminary injunction based on alleged 
copyright infringement.232  The court noted at the outset: “This case 
comes to us in the guise of an alleged copyright infringement but, in 
reality, is an attempt by a domestic manufacturer to prevent the 
importation of its own products by the ‘gray market.’”233  Sebastian 
International, Inc. (Sebastian), a California company, manufactured 
and marketed personal beauty care supplies.234  Specifically, two of 
its products, “WET” and “SHPRITZ FORTE,” carried “copyrights for 
the text and artistic content of their labels.”235  Sebastian established a 
marketing policy restricting retail sales of its products to professional 
salons.236  This strategy was designed to foster Sebastian’s image, 
reputation, and commercial success.237 
In 1986, Sebastian entered into an oral contract with Consumer 
Contacts (PTY) Ltd., a South African corporation doing business 
under the name 3-D Marketing Services (3-D), in which 3-D agreed 
to distribute Sebastian beauty products in South Africa exclusively.238  
Sebastian shipped four cases of “WET” and “SHPRITZ FORTE” and 
other products valued at $200,000 to 3-D in South Africa in January 
 
231 Maureen M. Cyr, Note, Determining the Scope of a Copyright Owner’s Right to Bar 
Imports: L’Anza Research International, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, 73 Wash. L. 
Rev. 81, 91–92 (1998). 
232 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
233 Id. at 1094. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
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of 1987.239  3-D received the shipment and then reshipped the 
unopened containers back to the United States in May 1987.240  One 
week later, Sebastian filed suit, seeking a preliminary injunction 
against 3-D for alleged breach of contract; later, Sebastian amended 
the complaint to include a count for copyright infringement.241  After 
surveying the limited case law, the district court issued the 
preliminary injunction on the strength of section 602, holding the 
“copyright holder has a right to control importation of copies, 
regardless of where they were made and despite the occurrence of a 
‘first sale.’”242 
The Third Circuit concluded that sections 109 and 602 were 
“provisions . . . intended to function interdependently and may be 
read in harmony with each other.”243  In vacating the preliminary 
injunction, the court stated its decision “reconciles sections 106(3) 
and 602(a) by reasoning that the importation prohibition does not 
enlarge the distribution rights, but serves only as a specific example 
of those rights subject still to the first sale limitation.”244  The court 
held that “a first sale by the copyright owner extinguishes any right 
later to control importation of those copies.”245 
3.  Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, 
Inc.: The Final Volley in the War? 
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, 
Inc. (Quality King), represented the first gray market case the U.S. 
Supreme Court had heard under copyright law.246  L’anza Research 
 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 1094–95. 
242 Id. at 1095. 
243 Id. at 1097. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 1099.  Commenting on the underlying controversy—gray market 
importation—the court offered the following insight: 
 Although this case turns purely on copyright law, we recognize that the 
underlying “gray market,” or “parallel importing,” issues really are dominant. . . .  
 . . . This twist has created the anomalous situation in which the dispute at hand 
superficially targets a product’s label, but in reality rages over the product itself.  
We think that the controversy over “gray market” goods, or “parallel importing,” 
should be resolved directly on its merits by Congress, not by judicial extension of 
the Copyright Act’s limited monopoly. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
246 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
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International, Inc. (L’anza), a California-based manufacturer and 
distributor of shampoos, conditioners, and other hair care products, 
sold its high-quality products to authorized vendors, such as beauty 
salons and colleges.247  Abroad, L’anza sold its products to “master 
distributors,” which were contractually obligated to sell those 
products in defined geographical areas.248  L’anza’s master 
distributors paid approximately thirty-five to forty percent less for 
L’anza products than domestic distributors.249  L’anza justified such 
price discrimination on the fact that master distributors do not receive 
the benefit of L’anza’s extensive advertising and promotional 
activities conducted in the United States, and the master distributors 
were forced to market their products themselves.250  In every foreign 
shipment, L’anza marked some of its bottles to allow for tracing.251 
In February of 1994, L’anza discovered that several of its products 
were being sold at Vessey Drugs, a California drugstore.252  L’anza 
determined, through tracing, that the products Vessey Drugs was 
selling had been purchased from L. Intertrade, a L’anza distributor in 
Malta, and imported without L’anza’s permission by Quality King 
Distributors.253  Originally, the products were manufactured in the 
United States by L’anza and then sold to L’anza’s distributor in the 
United Kingdom, Planetary Eco, then to L. Intertrade.254  Consistent 
with its pricing policy, “L’anza sold the products at a substantial 
discount with the understanding that [it] would be distributed in 
Malta, and possibly Libya.”255  Instead, L. Intertrade sold the 
products L’anza shipped to Planetary Eco in the United Kingdom for 
reimportation in the United States.256 
L’anza brought suit against Quality King for selling its products, 
alleging that Quality King’s sale of L’anza products infringed 
L’anza’s copyright under section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 
1976.  At trial, Quality King raised the first sale doctrine, section 
 
247 Id. at 138. 
248 L’anza Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
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109(a), as an affirmative defense to its importation and sale of L’anza 
products.  On July 25, 1995, the federal district court issued an order 
permanently enjoining Quality King from importing and selling 
L’anza products.257  On September 29, 1995, the court entered a 
judgment in the amount of $132,616 in favor of L’anza, as stipulated 
by the parties.258 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Quality King alleged that the 
district court erred by rejecting its first sale defense and declining to 
adopt the Third Circuit’s holding in Sebastian International, Inc. v. 
Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.259  After a lengthy discussion of the 
case law, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, 
holding that the first sale doctrine did not apply to Quality King 
because the doctrine “‘presupposes that the copyright owner will be 
able to realize the full value of each authorized copy . . . upon its first 
sale to a purchaser.’”260  According to the court, this did not happen 
in L’anza’s situation, because L’anza intended that its product be sold 
outside the United States and not reach the U.S. market.261 
The Supreme Court noted that the “question presented by this case 
is whether the right granted by § 602(a) is . . . limited by §§ 107 
through 120.  More narrowly, the question is whether the ‘first sale’ 
doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to imported copies.”262  
Observing that L’anza’s products were produced in the United States, 
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that: 
 After the first sale of a copyrighted item “lawfully made under 
this title,” any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or 
from a foreign reseller, is obviously an “owner” of that item.  Read 
literally, § 109(a) unambiguously states that such an owner “is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell” that 
item.  Moreover, since § 602(a) merely provides that unauthorized 
importation is an infringement of an exclusive right “under section 
106,” and since that limited right does not encompass resales by 
lawful owners, the literal text of § 602(a) is simply inapplicable to 
 
257 Id. at 1112. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. (citing Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d 
Cir. 1988)). 
260 Id. (omission in original) (quoting 1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.5, at 588–89 (2d 
ed. 1996)). 
261 Id. at 1114. 
262 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998). 
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both domestic and foreign owners of L’anza’s products who decide 
to import them and resell them in the United States.263 
The Supreme Court cleared the way for importation of gray market 
copyrighted goods.  The Court rejected L’anza’s construction of 
section 602(a), which grants rights distinct from section 106(3) and 
section 109(a) standing alone.  With respect to sections 106(3) and 
109(a), the Court noted “[i]f § 602(a) functioned independently, none 
of those sections [107 through 120] would limit its coverage.”264  
Thus, “[t]he whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the 
copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce 
by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control 
its distribution.”265  In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg made 
the following important observation: “This case involves a ‘round 
trip’ journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to 
places abroad, then back again.  I join the Court’s opinion recognizing 
that we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing 
imports were manufactured abroad.”266  Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence was poignant and prophetic.  Clearly, the debate was not 
finished. 
4.  Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.: The Gray Market Saga 
Continues 
In Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was forced to 
address whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., . . . 
requires [the court] to overrule . . . precedents that allow a 
defendant in a copyright infringement action to claim the “first sale 
doctrine” of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) as a defense only where the 
disputed copies of a copyrighted work were either made or 
previously sold in the United States with the authority of the 
copyright owner.267 
Omega S.A. (Omega) filed claims against Costco for infringing 
importation and unauthorized distribution of “Omega watches bearing 
a design registered with the U.S. Copyright Office,” under 17 U.S.C. 
 
263 Id. at 145. 
264 Id. at 150. 
265 Id. at 152. 
266 Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
267 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted). 
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§§ 106(3) and 602(a).268  “The district court granted summary 
judgment to Costco on the basis of the first sale doctrine” and 
awarded substantial attorneys’ fees to Costco.269 
Omega manufactures luxury watches in Switzerland and sells them 
globally through authorized distribution networks consisting of 
distributors and retailers.270  Omega engraved the watches in question 
with an “Omega Globe Design” on their undersides that was 
registered and copyrighted in the United States.271  Costco obtained 
the copyrighted watches on the gray market.272  First, Omega sold the 
watches to authorized dealers abroad.273  “Unidentified third parties 
eventually purchased the watches and sold them to ENE Limited, a 
New York company, which in turn sold them to Costco.  Costco then 
sold the watches to consumers in California.”274  The Court observed: 
“Although Omega authorized the initial foreign sale of the watches, it 
did not authorize their importation into the United States or the sales 
made by Costco.”275 
Both Omega and Costco moved for summary judgment.276  Costco 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment alleging that under 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a), “the first sale doctrine, Omega’s initial foreign sale 
of the watches precludes claims of infringing distribution . . . in 
connection with the subsequent, unauthorized sales.”277  On cross-
motions for summary judgment, without explanation, the district court 
ruled in favor of Costco and awarded $373,003.80 in attorneys’ 
fees.278 
In the face of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Quality King, the 
Ninth Circuit was faced with a dilemma.  Did Quality King mean that 
 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 984. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id.  With respect to the first sale doctrine, the Court observed the following: “This    
. . . section codifies the so-called ‘first sale doctrine,’ which holds that ‘[o]nce [a] 
copyright owner consents to the sale of particular copies of his work, he may not thereafter 
exercise the distribution right with respect to those copies.’”  Id. at 985 (alterations in 
original) (quoting 2-8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8.12(B)(1), at 8-156 (1978)). 
278 Id. 
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the first sale doctrine provides an almost-blanket defense to gray 
market importers who import copyrighted goods?  In Omega S.A. v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., the Ninth Circuit held “that Quality King did 
not invalidate our general rule that § 109(a) can provide a defense 
against §§ 106(3) and 602(a) claims only insofar as the claims involve 
domestically made copies of U.S.-copyrighted works.”279  In order to 
reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit examined precedent to 
determine the scope of the first sale doctrine.280  Turning squarely to 
the impact of Quality King, the court observed the following: 
 It is clear that Quality King did not directly overrule BMG 
Music, Drug Emporium, and Denbicare.  Quality King involved 
“round trip” importation: a product with a U.S.-copyrighted label 
was manufactured inside the United States, exported to an 
authorized foreign distributor, sold to unidentified third parties 
overseas, shipped back into the United States without the copyright 
owner’s permission, and then sold in California by unauthorized 
retailers. . . . The Court held that § 109(a) can provide a defense to 
an action under § 602(a) in this context. . . . However, because the 
facts involved only domestically manufactured copies, the Court did 
not address the effect of § 109(a) on claims involving unauthorized 
importation of copies made abroad. . . . “[W]e do not today resolve 
cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured 
abroad.”281 
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit points out that within the context 
of the Quality King decision, the first sale doctrine has to be viewed 
as a valid defense only in a situation where the U.S. copyright holder 
is the victim of gray market importation in a “round trip” situation.  In 
Omega, the Ninth Circuit explicitly notes that the first sale doctrine 
may not be a defense when the U.S. copyright holder manufactures 
products abroad, which are then imported by a third party to compete 
with sales of copyrighted goods in the United States.282  The Ninth 
Circuit noted that “[t]he basis for that rule was our concern that 
applying § 109(a) to foreign-made copies would violate the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.”283 
 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 985–86. 
281 Id. at 987 (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Quality King Distribs., 
Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
282 Id. at 990. 
283 Id. at 987. 
 We reject Costco’s contention and hold that the Supreme Court’s brief 
discussion on extraterritoriality is not “clearly irreconcilable” with our general 
limitation of § 109(a) to copies that are lawfully made in the United States. . . . 
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that following Costco’s argument 
concerning application of the first sale doctrine in a non-”round trip” 
case would lead to a rather absurd result.  “Given this understanding 
of the presumption, the application of § 109(a) to foreign-made copies 
would impermissibly apply the Copyright Act extraterritorially in a 
way that the application of the statute after foreign sales does not.”284  
To buttress this point, the Ninth Circuit drew from an illustration in 
Quality King: 
The Court stated that given “a publisher of [a] U.S. edition [of a 
work] and a publisher of [a] British edition of the same work, each 
such publisher could make lawful copies.  If the author of the work 
gave the exclusive United States distribution rights—enforceable 
under the Act—to the publisher of the United States edition and the 
exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the British 
edition, however, presumably only those made by the publisher of 
the United States edition would be ‘lawfully made under this title’ 
within the meaning of § 109(a).  The first sale doctrine would not 
provide the publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in 
the American market with a defense to an action under § 602(a).”    
. . . Assuming the British edition was made outside the United 
States, . . . this illustration suggests that “lawfully made under this 
title” refers exclusively to copies of U.S.-copyrighted works that are 
made domestically.  Were it otherwise, the copies made by the 
British publisher would also fall within the scope of § 109(a).285 
In Omega, the Ninth Circuit explicitly ruled that the first sale 
doctrine was not a defense for Costco.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
held that precedent was not inconsistent and irreconcilable with 
Quality King.286  In reaching this holding, the Ninth Circuit observed: 
 In summary, our general rule that § 109(a) refers “only to copies 
legally made . . . in the United States” . . . is not clearly 
irreconcilable with Quality King, and, therefore, remains binding 
precedent.  Under this rule, the first sale doctrine is unavailable as a 
defense to the claims under §§ 106(3) and 602(a) because there is 
no genuine dispute that Omega manufactured the watches bearing 
the Omega Globe Design in Switzerland. 
 
The common understanding of the presumption against extraterritoriality is that a 
U.S. statute “appl[ies] only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within, 
the territory of the United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the 
statute.” 
Id. at 987–88 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
284 Id. at 988. 
285 Id. at 989 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 148. 
286 Id. at 990. 
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 . . . There is no genuine dispute that the copies of the Omega 
Globe Design were sold in the United States without Omega’s 
authority.  The exception, therefore, does not apply in this case.287 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Costco certiorari.288  
Perhaps the Court will provide a clear answer to the question of 
whether the first sale doctrine applies to copyrighted goods that are 
manufactured abroad and imported into the United States without the 
authority of the copyright holder.  The Supreme Court will write the 
sequel to the gray market saga. 
IV 
THE INTERSECTION OF TORTS LAW AND THE GRAY MARKET 
As this Article has demonstrated, excluding gray market goods 
through litigation is an extremely difficult task.  Under trademark law, 
efforts to invalidate the Customs Service’s interpretation of the Tariff 
Act and the Lanham Act have largely been unsuccessful.  Under 
section 602(a) of the Copyright Act, the result has been the same.  
The common law tort of intentional interference with contract 
relations has emerged as an alternative means to attack the 
phenomena of parallel importation.289  “This cause of action is 
usually brought when the mark is not registered in the United States 
or when plaintiff is unable to establish injury by illegal grey-market 
importing under section 526.”290  The cause of action has four 
elements: (1) the plaintiff must show that a valid contract exists, (2) 
the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew the contract existed, 
(3) the defendant must intentionally cause breach, and (4) damages 
must result from the defendant’s intentional breach of the contract.291 
 
287 Id. (first omission in original) (citations omitted). 
288 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., No. 
08-1423 (May 18, 2009). 
289 See generally Millrood, supra note 76, at 359. 
290 Harry Rubin, Destined to Remain Grey: The Eternal Recurrence of Parallel Imports, 
26 INT’L LAW. 597, 610 (1992). 
291 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 766 (1979). 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a 
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing 
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for 
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to 
perform the contract. 
Id. 
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Practically speaking, how could an American manufacturer take 
steps to protect its interests with regard to the gray market through use 
of American tort law?  The American manufacturer would have to 
take four critical steps to ensure that a tort cause of action would exist 
to thwart gray market importation.  First, it is important for a 
manufacturer to create and maintain strong distribution and licensing 
contracts with distributees and licensees.  This helps meet the first 
element outlined above.  Second, manufacturers can make their 
contracts known to third parties through clear and distinct product 
labels and warnings, which strongly caution against and deem gray 
market importation to be illegal, integrated in their products or as part 
of their wrapping and packaging.  This would help meet the second 
element.  Third, by establishing product labels and warnings that 
notify third parties, intentional, voluntary, and volitional breach of the 
label warning against gray market importation by such parties would 
be easy to demonstrate.  This complies with the third element of the 
cause of action.  Fourth, a strong inventory and product-tracking 
protocol and system would enable the manufacturer to detect and 
quantify goods that are imported through the gray market to compete 
with domestic products.  This would go a long way toward 
quantifying damages and thereby meeting the fourth and final element 
outlined above.  A handful of cases have examined intentional 
interference with performance of contract by a third party. 
In DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., DEP Corporation (DEP), the 
plaintiff, had an exclusive contract to distribute soap in the United 
States absent trademark rights and assignment.292  Interstate Cigar 
Company, the defendant, began purchasing the soap from third parties 
in Europe, and then importing and selling it at lower prices than 
DEP.293  The Second Circuit, on appeal, suggested that absent any 
property rights in the trademark, DEP could bring a cause of action 
based on intentional interference with contract relations under the 
exclusive dealing agreement.294 
Similarly, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Super Scale Models, 
Ltd., a toy train distributor brought an action against a competitor for 
intentional interference with the distributor’s existing contract with a 
German-based toy train manufacturer by rendering the contract less 
 
292 DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 621 (2d Cir. 1980). 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 624. 
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profitable for the distributor.295  The trademarks for the toy trains 
were registered in Germany, not the United States.296  Thus, Railway 
Express, the plaintiff, did not have a cause of action for trademark 
infringement or exclusion under customs law.  Instead, Railway 
Express commenced suit under a theory of intentional interference 
with contract relations. 
The Seventh Circuit held that Railway Express failed to prove an 
essential element of the tortious interference claim: damage or injury.  
However, the court stated that Railway Express “could have 
established the requisite damage in any of a number of ways.”297  For 
example, the plaintiff could have presented evidence that the 
defendant damaged Railway Express’s “ability to sell E.P. Lehmann’s 
product by selling an inferior grade of LGB merchandise or by 
creating consumer confusion concerning the quality of LGB 
equipment [or] by demonstrating that [the defendant] made sales to     
. . . existing clientele.”298  As the plaintiff made no such attempt, the 
court dismissed the claim.299 
As this examination of the case law demonstrates, tort law may 
present a viable means to thwart gray market importation.  As with 
any tort, the plaintiff has the burden of proving all elements.  As the 
Railway Express Agency case demonstrated, the prospective plaintiff 
must zealously ensure that it can prove all elements of its claim.  
Taking the steps outlined above, a plaintiff could sustain an action for 
intentional interference with performance of contract by a third 
person. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this Article, I posed the following question: Ever 
wonder how you got that camera, television, or other product so 
cheap?  As this Article has demonstrated, when one digs below the 
surface, the likely answer is that that camera, television, or other 
cheap product came from a gray market source.  American trademark 
or copyright holders may never stop that camera, television, or other 
product obtained on the gray market from competing with and 
 
295 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Super Scale Models, Ltd., 934 F.2d 135, 136 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
296 Id. at 136. 
297 Id. at 140. 
298 Id. 
299 See id. at 141. 
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undercutting the sale of their domestically manufactured American 
products.  The challenge is difficult and daunting, especially for the 
unsavvy and unwary.  The gray market is vast and lucrative.  Many 
goods fall victim to the gray market.  It would not exist if people were 
not concerned with making large sums of money—the profit motive is 
supreme in our society. 
As this Article has demonstrated, gray market importation has 
become a contentious issue in international-trade circles.  Efforts of 
trademark and copyright holders to exclude gray market goods 
through trademark, customs, and copyright law have largely failed.  
At least in the United States, judicial and administrative interpretation 
of the law has opened the door to gray market goods.  For the 
moment, parallel importation is a legal practice.  American 
manufacturers would be wise to consider an action based on 
intentional interference with performance of contract by a third 
person as a viable means and legal strategy to hold back the tide of 
gray market goods.  Tort law may offer a viable solution to a complex 
and challenging problem. 
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